A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice 15 as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we 16 focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under 17 this mechanism. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first highlight the existence of a 18 paradox. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in 19 cooperation evolves towards ever-higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or 20 runaway cooperation. Our model shows that this runaway process leads to a profitless escalation 21 of the level of cooperation, up to the point where the cost of cooperation exactly cancels out its 22 benefit. In other words, at first sight, under the effect of partner choice we predict that 23 cooperation should have no benefit at ESS. Second, importing models from matching theory in 24 economics we, however, show that, when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in 25 function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to 26 outbid others, and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. Assortative 27 partner choice then leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This 28 result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by 29 considerations of social efficiency. 30 31
Introduction
Cooperation among non-kin constitutes a puzzle for evolutionary biologists, and a large body of 36 theoretical models, inspired by game theory, have been developed to solve it. The most 37 commonly accepted explanation is that cooperation can be enforced if it triggers a conditional 38 response on the part of others (West et al. 2007) . Several enforcement mechanisms have been 39 proposed: direct reciprocity (Trivers 1971 The key idea of partner choice models is that, when one happens to be paired with a defecting 5 principle, this runaway should proceed up to the point where the cost of investing into 81 cooperation cancels out the benefit of finding a partner (West-Eberhard 1979; Fisher 1999 p.152 ) 82 that is up to the "wasteful" threshold where cooperation becomes fruitless. Is competitive 83 altruism, however, balanced by opposite forces, leading to an evolutionary stabilization of 84 cooperation below this threshold? Is this level socially optimal, or does partner choice lead to the 85 investment into counterproductive forms of cooperation to out-compete others as it does in 86 sexual selection? 87 88 Most previous models on partner choice have not addressed these questions, either because they 89 have assumed that cooperation is an all-or-nothing decision (Eshel and Cavalli-Sforza 1982;  In this paper, we build a model inspired by McNamara et al. (2008) , in which a quantitative level 97 of cooperation expressed by individuals jointly evolves with a quantitative level of choosiness 98 regarding others' cooperation. Analysing this model, we first confirm the existence of a paradox. 99 Partner choice does create a competition to be chosen as a partner, leading to a runaway of 100 cooperation and choosiness up to the point where the cost of cooperation entirely cancels out its When they are solitary, individuals gain a payoff per unit of time. When involved into an 139 interaction, they gain a social payoff that depends on both partners' cooperation level. The 140 cooperative interaction is a continuous prisoner's dilemma: making an investment brings benefits 141 to the partner but comes at a cost to the provider. As stated in the introduction, we make the where individual paired with is the stopping rate of the interaction. The socially optimal level 151 of cooperation is ̂= 1/2 . Beyond this level, the net benefit of cooperation decreases. 152 Eventually, the interaction becomes entirely profitless, or even costly, if individuals invest more 153 than the "wasteful threshold" = 1/ . We allow both cooperation and choosiness to take any We are interested in the joint evolution of cooperation, and choosiness by natural selection. We 170 undertake and compare the consequences of two distinct assumptions. In a first approach, we 171 assume that both cooperation and choosiness are hard-wired traits, that is each individual is 9 characterized by a single level of cooperation ̅ and a single choosiness , both expressed 173 unconditionally. In a second approach, we still assume that cooperation is a hard-wired trait, but 174 we consider that choosiness is a reaction norm by which individuals respond to their own 175 phenotypic cooperation. with the mean probability for an encounter between the mutant and a resident to be mutually 186 accepted, and ̅ the mutant mean social payoff (see Table 1 for a list of the parameters of the 187 model). This expression is similar to the classical sequential encounter model of optimal diet 188 (Schoener 1971) . We could not derive an analytical expression of the evolutionarily stable strategy. However, we 194 numerically computed the selection gradient on each trait, in order to study the evolutionary 195 trajectories. 196 [ Because cooperation is subject to phenotypic noise (i.e. one does not perfectly control one's own 201 level of cooperation), it could make sense, at least in principle, for individuals to adapt plastically 202 their degree of choosiness to the actual phenotypic cooperation that they happen to express. For 203 instance, it could make sense for those individuals who happen to be phenotypically more 204 generous to be also choosier, and vice versa. In our second model, we aim to explore the 205 consequences of this possibility. To do so, we assume that choosiness is not a hard-wired trait, 206 but a plastic decision that individuals take in function of their own phenotypic cooperation. An 207 individual's "choosiness strategy" is thus defined as a reaction norm rather than a single value. We run simulations both under the assumption that choosiness is hard-wired, and under the 260 assumption that it is a reaction norm. In the second case, we test two types of reaction norms. 261 First, we consider polynomial functions, the coefficients of which evolve by natural selection. 262 Second, we consider step functions with evolving coefficients coding for the value of choosiness 263 for each interval of cooperation. In the initial generation, all reaction norms are set to a constant 264 zero function, so that individuals are never choosy at initiation. = 1/ , that is the precise level at which the cost of cooperation for the helper entirely cancels 288 out its benefit for the helpee (Fig. 2b ). Individual-based simulations confirm these results (see 289 SI). Note that Wild and Cojocaru (2016, inspired by Barclay 2011) also showed that partner choice 304 could, under some circumstances, drive the evolution of cooperation up to a "wasteful threshold". 305 However, in their model, the choosiness strategy was fixed, and not necessarily optimal; it did 306 not evolve jointly with cooperation. The present results are thus more robust and general. Individual-based simulations confirm this result. Fig. 3 shows the reaction norm at evolutionary 329 equilibrium in these simulations: choosiness is strictly increasing, at least around the levels of 330 phenotypic cooperation that are actually present at equilibrium. Outside this range, selection is 331 very weak on the reaction norm, and we observe larger confidence intervals. As expected, when 332 the market tends to be frictionless, the reaction norm becomes very close to the identity function, 333 that is to a strict positive assortative matching ( Fig. 3a and b , orange dashed line). Importantly, the evolution of a plastic rather than hard-wired choosiness strategy has a key 338 consequence regarding the evolution of cooperation. When choosiness is plastic, cooperation 339 stabilizes at a level largely below the wasteful threshold ( Fig. 4) . As a result, in contrast with the 340 hard-wired case, at the evolutionary equilibrium, cooperation has a strictly positive net benefit. 341 What is more, when market fluidity is large (partner change has a small cost), cooperation 342 evolves precisely towards the socially optimal level, i.e. the level that maximizes the net total 343 payoff of individuals (̂= 1/2 ).
345
This result can also be understood intuitively. In the first model where choosiness was hard-346 wired, it was adaptive to increase one's cooperation level beyond the population mean because, 347 by doing so, an individual could switch from "being rejected by everyone", to "being accepted by 348 everyone". The runaway process, therefore, proceeded until cooperation had no benefit at all. In 349 contrast, in the present model where choosiness is plastic, increasing one's cooperation level is 350 beneficial because it allows one to access better partners. Hence, this is useful only provided the 351 benefit of accessing a higher quality partner is larger than the cost of being more cooperative. As 352 a result, cooperation only rises up to the social optimum, where its net benefit is maximized. In a first model, we have found that the mechanism of partner choice seems to be incompatible 365 with the evolution of an efficient level of cooperation. To understand intuitively, consider a 366 population with a given distribution of cooperation levels, with some particularly generous 367 individuals, some particularly stingy individuals, and a given mean cooperation level. In such a 368 population, provided that the variability of cooperation is sufficiently large and the market 369 sufficiently fluid, it is always adaptive to accept only partners that are slightly better than average 370 (McNamara et al. 2008 ). Hence, natural selection favours individuals with a choosiness always slightly larger than the average cooperation level. In turn, this choosiness selects for mutants 372 whose cooperation level is larger than the mean, which leads to a gradual increase in cooperation. 373 This runaway process drives cooperation up to the point where interactions become totally 374 profitless because the cost of cooperation entirely cancels out its benefits ( Figs. 1 and 2) . Thus, 375 partner choice prompts individuals to invest into counterproductive forms of cooperation to 376 outbid others, leading to an eventually fruitless arms race. evolutionarily stable reaction norm is a monotonously increasing function of cooperation (Fig. 3) . 383 This implies that more generous individuals are also choosier, leading to a positive assortative 384 matching: generous individuals tend to interact with other generous individuals, and vice versa. 385 Furthermore, if the biological market is fluid enough (i.e. if the cost of changing partner is low), 386 this positive assortative matching becomes very close to a perfect matching in which individuals 387 with a given level of cooperation always interact with other individuals with the exact same level 388 ( Fig. 3a and b) . in contrast with our results, cooperation never reaches the socially optimal level. In a 424 complementary analysis (see SI), we showed that this is a consequence of their assumption that 425 the genetic mutation rate is very high, which prevents natural selection from fully optimizing 426 social strategies. One limit of our model is that we did not introduce an explicit mechanism for reputation. We 505 simply assumed that, in a way or another, individuals have reliable information regarding the 506 cooperation level of others, but we did not model the way in which they obtain this information.
507
Costly signalling theory proposes that some cooperative behaviours are costly signals of an Parameters: there are three values for the encounter rate β = 0.1; 0.01; 0.001 respectively for high, medium and low market fluidity. Other parameters are the same as in Fig. 3 
